Subject: Fair Election Process

September 29, 2008

Ms. Linda Tulett
Registrar of Voters, Monterey County Elections Department
1370B South Main Street
Salinas, CA. 93901

Dear Ms. Tulett,

As you know, there is nationwide concern about the security and transparency of the election process since the 2002 HAVA legislation resulted in the use of electronic voting machinery run on proprietary software controlled by corporate vendors. California has moved to paper ballots but, in Monterey County, there are still concerns about the use of Sequoia optical scanning tabulators.

The League of Women Voters support measures that will protect every citizen’s right to vote, ensure government’s responsibility to protect this right through regulations and procedures that encourage an informed and active electorate, and ensure that election services safeguard the voting process. A fair election process should include the following elements:

1. The required audit (post election manual tally requirement) should be conducted in full public view from beginning to end.
    
2. The random precinct selection should occur immediately preceding the post election manual tally.
    
3. All ballots for the randomly selected precinct (even absentee ballots which arrive after Friday preceding Election Day) should be included in the post election manual tally (audit).
    
4. Precinct tallies should be printed as soon as tabulated on a day by day basis so that there is a running total. Each batch tally run through the tabulator should then be available to the public.
    
5. Duplicated ballots and their originals should be made available to the public for examination and the reason for their duplication should be described. If this is not possible due to legal and/or privacy concerns, a report that details the number and type of duplicated ballots and reasons for duplication should be published. An analysis by precinct would be useful to determine if there were particular problem areas and/or training and education opportunities. The report should include the procedure used by poll workers when making duplicates.
    
6. Accuracy testing (calibration testing) should be done while the machines in "election" mode (not test mode) on real ballots and in public view. This will facilitate the evaluation of the dependability of the machines under conditions, as close as possible to the actual election process.

If these elements are not already in place, we ask that they be implemented for the upcoming November election cycle. If you wish to discuss these issues further, we are available to meet with you at your earliest convenience.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours,

Janet Brennan , President                              MaryEllen Dick, President
LWV of the Monterey Peninsula                      LWV of the Salinas Valley